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INTRODUCTION 
Though they often skirt the legal perimeter, the Bush Administration’s 
national security policies are undoubtedly creative. The Administration’s 
inventiveness demands a similar agility from the lawyers challenging these 
policies, particularly since the federal courts are understandably reluctant to 
interfere with the Executive in the midst of an armed conflict. While procedural 
arguments based on the separation of powers have met with some success in 
the courts, new legislation resulting from new Administration strategies 
requires a fresh approach. The Equal Protection Clause is a powerful and, thus 
far, unused arrow in the constitutional quiver. Its greatest utility is that, like the 
separation of powers claim, it can be styled as an avoidance argument. 
It is too difficult and too soon for courts to decide whether all of the federal 
government’s post-September 11, 2001 policies are substantively correct. 
Despite the waves of litigation and commentary charging that the 
Administration’s actions are illegal to the core, neither the courts nor the public 
have reached agreement, in just over five years, on how to balance individual 
liberty and national security. The questions posed by terrorism are just too new 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Lead Counsel in Hamdan v. 
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and the dangers of asymmetric warfare (both in probability and extent of 
damage) too uncertain at this early date. 
Modern constitutional law has developed a variety of doctrines for courts 
to employ when the boundaries of personal liberty are vague. Separation of 
powers doctrine has come into vogue, for example, as litigants stress the role of 
Congress in curbing Executive excesses. The petitioner in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,1 for example, emphasized that military commissions required 
congressional approval, not just presidential fiat, to survive. That litigation 
strategy avoided asking the Court to freeze a particular substantive conception 
of law into place; it stressed instead that the Court did not have to decide 
whether military commissions were constitutionally permissible until Congress 
first authorized them. In effect, the claims in Hamdan can be seen as a species 
of constitutional avoidance canons—at least insofar as they avoid individual-
rights claims. Avoidance doctrines are crucial not simply to sidestep judicial 
review that invalidates the actions of the political branches, but also to avoid 
review that ratifies them by upholding them against constitutional challenge.2 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld addressed one particular question regarding the 
balance of rights and security, but it deferred for future resolution a second, 
substantively different, problem: discrimination against aliens. Since the 
September 11 attacks, the government has repeatedly singled out aliens for 
special disfavor. This trend began with the President’s ill-fated November 13, 
2001 Military Order to establish military commissions to try suspected war 
criminals.3 That order only applied to foreigners; American citizens were 
intentionally made exempt from that backwards trial system. Justifying this 
policy, then Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress:  
To those who pit Americans against immigrants, citizens against non-citizens, 
to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my 
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national 
unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies 
and pause to America’s friends. They encourage people of good will to remain 
silent in the face of evil.4 
Some refused to stay silent, including the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Hamdan. After the Court struck down the military tribunal order, 
 
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). 
2. Justice Jackson put the point this way in Korematsu: 
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
Constitution, . . . the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in 
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like 
a loaded weapon . . . . Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and 
thinking and expands it to new purposes.  
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
3.  Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).  
4. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending 
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 313 (2001) 
(statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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however, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA),5 which 
applied the same distinction between aliens and citizens. As such, the MCA 
shunts the millions of green card holders6 and five billion people across the 
planet into a category that enables a different, and far inferior, trial procedure 
than what American citizens face. Since at least the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee, such legislation has never been 
placed in the United States Code. Particularly in an era of global 
constitutionalism and emphasis on the rule of law, such rank discrimination is 
constitutionally suspect. 
The insistence on basic equality is the spirit animating the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the contemporaneous 1870 Enforcement Act, and repeated 
pronouncements in constitutional law about laws of general applicability from 
Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in McCulloch to Justice Scalia’s recent 
opinion in Cruzan.7 It also tracks the modern revolution in the laws of war, 
codified most powerfully in the Geneva Conventions. And comparative 
experience suggests the importance of the principle in litigation, as recently 
underscored by the British House of Lords’ decision to strike down its 
detention scheme on equality grounds because it discriminated against non-
British citizens.8 
While discrimination by the federal government against aliens might be 
justified when it is handing out government benefits, it is not appropriate when 
it determines whether someone can be put before a tribunal whose jurisdiction 
includes dispensing the most awesome powers of government, such as life 
imprisonment and the death penalty. When legislation singles out powerless 
aliens, moreover, the standard checks on government abuse, such as political 
accountability, fail to operate. The result is not only that the legislation runs 
afoul of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, it also eliminates that 
legislation from the zone of deference traditionally due to the political 
branches. To make matters worse, such line drawing on the basis of alienage 
also undermines effective fighting in the war on terror. 
Now that Congress has begun to support, often hastily, some Bush 
Administration proposals, many are tempted to jump from the how of 
legislation to the what: questioning once again the substantive rights displaced 
 
5. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
6. While the government does not appear to maintain a precise listing of green card 
holders, from 1996-2005 approximately 8.75 million individuals obtained green cards. See 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 16 tbl.4 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf (author’s calculation of total green-card 
awardees for the period based on figures in the table is 8,754,458). Some of those individuals 
may have moved out of the country, but the 8.75 million figure is still artificially low 
because it does not include anyone who obtained a green card before 1996. 
7. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10 (discussing A v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68). 
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by government activity in the war on terror. This individual-liberty strategy 
risks placing undue pressure on the courts to rule in ways that, in some cases, 
may shackle the Executive Branch in a time of armed conflict. The logic of 
equal protection challenges, by contrast, does not require the political branches 
to attain any particular substantive standard of protection; it merely requires 
that the chosen standard be doled out evenhandedly to all persons. In short, 
instead of asking about the how or what, scholars and litigators should begin 
examining who is affected by the legal framework. Separately, analysis will 
need to focus on where the legal framework is operating—e.g., a battlefield, 
naval base, airport in Chicago, or elsewhere—as the scope of the equality 
guarantee may differ in each locale.9 
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE AS A CONSTRAINT  
ON GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 
Equality challenges have the potential to be the next big thing in the legal 
war on terror. Shortly after September 11, the impulse of many civil libertarians 
was to condemn legislation such as the PATRIOT Act as failing to comply with 
substantive constitutional guarantees. But those challenges largely failed or 
were deferred by the courts. Instead, the challenges that succeeded emphasized 
the lack of congressional support for actions taken by the Bush Administration. 
Now that Congress has begun to act in the war on terror, one might expect the 
focus of litigation to shift away from claims about the unilateral presidency to 
those about individual rights. But that path has considerable pitfalls, chief 
among them that it neglects the blatant discrimination against aliens in recent 
government policies. 
Before getting into the main example of the MCA, let me offer the key 
argument in this Article: when the contours of personal liberty are not clear, 
insistence upon equality in treatment will often be a way to achieve an optimal 
result. This tradition, which favors laws of general applicability, can be located 
in many places, such as Congress’s 1870 Enforcement Act. Section 16 of the 
Act, now codified as the familiar 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (with minor changes), 
provided as follows: 
And be it further enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the United 
States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person 
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and 
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.10 
 
9. See text accompanying notes 55-63. 
10. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2007)).  
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Most of this language, in turn, comes from its predecessor, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. It could be read, through our modern prism of race, to suggest that 
Congress was worried only about the newly freed slaves and race 
discrimination. That reading would not be without some justification, 
considering the drafters’ repeated use of the word “white.”11 But the drafters of 
the Enforcement Act added language to the 1866 Act to focus on alienage. This 
is how they modified the next section of the Act, with the italicized words in 
1870 replacing the predecessor (struckthrough) words from 1866: 
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be 
subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any 
right secured or protected by this act by the last preceding section of this act, 
or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person 
having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is 
prescribed for the punishment of white persons citizens, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or 
both, in the discretion of the court.12 
That statute is still on the books today, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, and reflects 
a powerful current in constitutional law. The Enforcement Act did not specify 
what punishment would look like; it merely said that in treating aliens, the 
punishment had to be symmetric with that of citizens. In this way, aliens would 
be “virtually” represented by citizens in the political process. 
There is a deep logic to this point—a logic that goes back to Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and to Chief Justice Marshall’s majestic 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland when he contended that a state tax applying 
equally to in-staters and out-of-staters would be permissible.13 Some of our 
most influential jurists in the modern era have voiced similar arguments. 
 
11. The last portion of the statutory section reveals a slight focus on aliens: “No tax or 
charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immigrating thereto from 
a foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person immigrating 
to such State from any other foreign country; and any law of any State in conflict with this 
provision is hereby declared null and void.” Id. 
12. Compare id. § 17, with Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27. The 
1870 Act was justified in terms that distinguished immigration: 
Now . . . I am opposed to Asiatics being brought here. . . . While they are here I say it is our 
duty to protect them. . . . I would be less than man if I did not insist, and I do here insist that 
that provision shall go on this bill, and that the pledge of this nation shall be redeemed, that 
we will protect Chinese aliens or any other aliens whom we allow to come here, and give 
them a hearing in our courts; let them sue and be sued; let them be protected by all the laws 
and the same laws that other men are. That is all there is in that provision. 
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (May 20, 1870) (statement of Mr. Stewart). 
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (“This opinion . . . does not extend to a tax 
paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the 
state, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this 
institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the state.”). 
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Consider Justice Scalia’s words in the Cruzan case: “Our salvation is the Equal 
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for 
themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”14 
Justice Scalia’s comments track those of Justice Jackson years earlier, who 
stated: 
Invocation of the equal protection clause [compared to the due process clause] 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. 
It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. 
. . . The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that 
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which 
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply 
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited 
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure 
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in 
operation.15 
Scholars such as John Hart Ely, Guido Calabresi, and David Cole have all 
made similar arguments.16 The force of these principles is at their height when 
life and death decisions are on the line. In an era where the boundaries of 
national security and personal liberty are being shaped in all sorts of 
unforeseen ways due to rapid changes in technology and the modern 
transportation revolution, the insistence on evenhandedness can at times be 
more appropriate than the attempts to freeze substantive standards into the 
Constitution. 
A. The MCA and Alienage 
1. The military commission provisions 
The commissions set up by the MCA, like President Bush’s first set of 
military commissions, appear to be the first ones in American history designed 
to apply only to foreigners. The United States first employed military 
commissions in the Mexican-American war and “a majority of the persons tried 
. . . were American citizens.”17 The tribunals in the Civil War naturally applied 
 
14. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
15. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
16. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2003); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 161-62 (1980); Guido Calabresi, The Supreme 
Court: 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What 
the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 92-93 (1991). 
17. David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st 
Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2030 (2003). 
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to citizens as well. And in Quirin, President Roosevelt applied the tribunals 
symmetrically to the saboteur who claimed to be an American citizen and the 
others who were indisputably German nationals, so much so that the Supreme 
Court was prompted to hold: “Citizenship in the United States of an enemy 
belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which 
is unlawful because in violation of the law of war.”18 
Congress justified the MCA in part on the ground that it spared American 
citizens,19 but that very asymmetry is one of its constitutional defects. An 
American citizen, even one who commits the most horrible and treasonous act 
imaginable (such as the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction), gets the 
“Cadillac” version of justice—a civil trial in federal court. Yet a green card 
holder alleged to have committed a far less egregious offense—such as being a 
chef for this treasonous American citizen—gets the “beat up Chevy” version of 
justice: a military commission at Guantanamo. In that commission, that 
noncitizen chef will have few of the very rights America has championed 
abroad, and he can be sentenced to death. 
Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause knew all too well that 
discrimination against noncitizens required constitutional prohibition. The 
clause’s text itself reflects this principle; unlike the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, which only applies to “citizens,” the drafters intentionally extended 
equal protection to “persons.”20 Foremost in their minds was the language of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had limited due process guarantees by framing 
them as nothing more than the “privileges of the citizen.”21 This language was 
 
18. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942). 
19. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S10,355 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl) (“[T]here is nothing wrong with this legislation before us limiting the rights of habeas 
to those who are citizens and not extending it to alien enemy combatants.”); 152 CONG. REC. 
S10,250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Warner) (“It is wrong to say that this 
provision captures any U.S. citizens. It does not. It is only directed at aliens—aliens, not U.S. 
citizens—bomb-makers, wherever they are in the world; those who provide the money to 
carry out the terrorism, wherever they are—again, only aliens . . . .”); id. at S10,267 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (“This legislation has nothing to do with citizens.”); id. at S10,274 
(statement of Sen. Bond) (“These people are not U.S. citizens, arrested in the U.S. on some 
civil offense; they are, by definition, aliens engaged in or supporting terrorist hostilities 
against the U.S., and doing so in violation of the laws of war.”); id. at H7542 (statement of 
Rep. Hunter) (“It does not take away the habeas rights of U.S. citizens.”); id. at H7544 
(statement of Rep. Buyer) (“It will not apply to United States citizens.”); id. at S10,251 
(statement of Sen. Graham) (“Under no circumstance can an American citizen be tried in a 
military commission.”); see also John M. Donnelly, Democrats Eye Changes for Military 
Tribunals Law That Covers Detainees, CQ TODAY, Dec. 1, 2006 (“Proponents of the law say 
. . . habeas corpus applies only to U.S. citizens, not alien combatants.”). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1442-47 (1992) (providing evidence 
that the Equal Protection Clause was intentionally written as it was specifically in order to 
extend certain rights to aliens). 
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 449 (1857). See generally AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 170-72 (1998) (tracing the 
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repeatedly mentioned in the Senate debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, 
with the very first draft of the Amendment distinguishing between persons and 
citizens: “Congress shall have power to . . . secure to all citizens 
. . . the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State 
equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”22 The 
Amendment’s principal author, Representative John Bingham, asked: “Is it not 
essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is 
it not essential . . . that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this 
land, shall have equal protection . . . ?”23 
As discussed above, Congress passed a contemporaneous law that 
underscored this guarantee of equal protection, the Enforcement Act of 1870.24 
The rank discrimination between foreigners and citizens on a matter of 
fundamental justice would thus appear to offend equal protection principles. 
Indeed, the foundational cases have consistently held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Enforcement Act apply to all persons, citizens and aliens 
alike. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the first case in which the Supreme Court 
confronted the constitutional rights of noncitizens after the enactment of the 
Equal Protection Clause, the unanimous Court asserted, “The fourteenth 
amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . 
[Its] provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or of 
nationality . . . .”25 It was for that reason, the Court said, that the 1870 
Enforcement Act was “accordingly enacted.”26 
The modern Supreme Court has held that state “classifications based on 
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny” since “[a]liens as a class are a prime example 
of a discrete and insular minority.”27 After all, aliens pay taxes, work, and live 
 
historical origins of the Equal Protection Clause and its use of the word “persons” to Dred 
Scott); id. at 217-18 n.* (stating that the Equal Protection Clause is “paradigmatically” 
concerned with “nonvoting aliens”). 
22. AMAR, supra note 21, at 173 (quoting a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment) 
(emphasis added) (omissions in original). 
23. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). Similarly, Senator Howard 
stated that the Amendment was necessary to “disable a State from depriving not merely a 
citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the 
State.” Id. at 2766. 
24. See supra note 10. 
25. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, a landmark case concerning 
the rights of alien children to an education, the Supreme Court directed, “an alien is surely a 
‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term,” and therefore entitled to equal protection of the 
laws. 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). 
26. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. 
27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (internal quotation and citations 
omitted). 
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under our laws. They can even be drafted and must register for the Selective 
Service System.28 Yet their exclusion from the franchise renders them 
politically weak. 
More deferential standards of judicial review, such as scrutiny for a 
rational basis, operate under the background assumption that “even improvident 
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”29 But there 
can be no warrant for such confidence when legislation only impacts those who 
cannot vote. As John Hart Ely put it, “[a]liens cannot vote in any state, which 
means that any representation they receive will be exclusively ‘virtual’” and 
“our legislatures are composed almost entirely of citizens who have always 
been such.”30 It would therefore seem inappropriate to rely on the standard 
political check to correct errors when alienage distinctions are employed. 
Justice Blackmun put the point well in an opinion that deserves resuscitation 
today: 
The very powerlessness of a discrete minority, then, is itself the factor that 
overcomes the usual presumption that even improvident decisions affecting 
minorities will eventually be rectified by the democratic process. If anything, 
the fact that aliens constitutionally may be—and generally are—formally and 
completely barred from participating in the process of self-government makes 
particularly profound the need for searching judicial review of classifications 
grounded on alienage.31 
Justice Blackmun’s view here bears a striking similarity to that of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1851: 
 [W]hen, in the exercise of proper legislative powers, general laws are 
enacted, which bear or may bear on the whole community, if they are unjust 
and against the spirit of the constitution, the whole community will be 
interested to procure their repeal by a voice potential. And that is the great 
security for just and fair legislation. 
 But when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted 
affecting their property, . . . who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the 
mass, in injury and injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of 
despotic power?32 
 
28. See Selective Serv. Sys., Who Must Register? (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.sss.gov/ 
FSwho.htm. 
29. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
30. ELY, supra note 16, at 161-62. 
31. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). Justice Stevens may be read as following Justice 
Blackmun’s strong view of accountability and equal protection. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517, 557 & n.36 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(“Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society. Disenfranchised, scorned and feared, often 
deservedly so, shut away from public view, prisoners are surely a ‘discrete and insular 
minority.’”). 
32. Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851). 
  
1374 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1365 
Notably, the Justices answered this question by saying that “the courts” were 
where such relief should be sought.33 
On the other hand, the text of the Equal Protection Clause does not bind the 
federal government, it only binds states. The Supreme Court has generally 
surmounted this textual hurdle by reading into the Fifth Amendment an 
equality guarantee, stating that there is a strong presumption of “congruence” 
under which “‘[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the 
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.’”34 The Court has even gone so 
far as to say that “the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable.”35 However, in a series of 
alienage cases, the Court has appeared to doubt the congruence principle.36 
Some of this language might be read to suggest that the strict judicial scrutiny 
to which state classifications based on citizenship are ordinarily subjected 
might arguably be inapplicable to the MCA’s stark discrimination between 
citizens and aliens. 
The precedent that gives the federal government wide berth in making 
alienage classifications, however, concerns two areas of law: immigration and 
government benefits.37 There is a rational basis, for example, for taxpayers to 
prefer doling out scarce welfare benefits to citizens. The decision about who 
may come onto our shores and make a life here is also one that the government 
by necessity has to make in ways that many would deem arbitrary. And 
immigration violations, too, are sui generis insofar as only aliens can commit 
them. In these settings, the government might conceivably be violating a 
philosophical sense of “equality,” but it is not denying equal protection of the 
law. 
 
33. Id. 
34. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
35. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217. 
36. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U.S. 88, 102, 104, 114-16 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976). 
37. A variety of laws restrict certain classifications of aliens from receiving 
government benefits. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (2007) (food stamps); 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a), 
(c)(1) (2007) (excluding undocumented aliens from any federal public benefit including “any 
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, 
food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or 
assistance are provided . . . by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the 
United States”); 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2007) (prohibiting states from providing “any State or 
local public benefit” to undocumented aliens unless the state enacts a law affirmatively 
providing for such eligibility); 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(1)(D) (2007) (earned income tax credit); 26 
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2007) (excluding undocumented aliens from unemployment 
insurance); 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403, 405(c)(2)(B)(i) (2007) (limiting Social Security benefits). 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act makes U.S. citizenship a qualification for 
airport security personnel. Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 111, 115 Stat. 597, 617 (2001) (codified at 
49 U.S.C. § 44935 (2007)). 
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The maneuvering room accorded the political branches “in the area of 
immigration and naturalization” thus has not extended to laws which impinge 
rights “protected by the Due Process Clause.”38 When liberty interests are at 
issue, “the Fifth Amendment . . . protects every one of these persons from 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one 
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled 
to that constitutional protection.”39 While courts have relaxed scrutiny when 
the government is handing out a “goody,” they have not done so when the 
disparity touches the raw nerve of equal justice under law. After all, the MCA 
curtails rights that, at least when made available to others similarly situated, 
have long been deemed too fundamental to be dispensed with using merely 
rational basis review.40 Suppose, for example, that trial by jury for 
misdemeanor offenses were made available only to those who were willing to 
pay for it, say a $5000 charge (to defray the marginal costs to government of 
actually putting on a jury trial, protecting jurors, and the like). In that setting, 
strict scrutiny, or something very close to it, would be mandatory,41 despite the 
mantra that poverty is not a suspect, or even a semi-suspect, classification.42 
The same follows when rights as basic as the jury trial are dispensed to 
citizens but not to aliens who are charged with identical offenses and who have 
exactly the same relationship to the very same international terrorist 
organizations with which we are at war.43 In short, although we might afford 
 
38. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78, 82. 
39. Id. at 77 (citations omitted). 
40. While the Court has not adopted a formula for heightened scrutiny when quasi-
fundamental rights are at stake for quasi-suspect classes, several decisions essentially 
suggest such a principle. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 230 (1982) (stating that 
because education plays a “fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society,” a 
Texas statute denying free public schooling to children who were not legally admitted into 
the United States must be justified by a “substantial state interest” and finding no such 
justification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that the cases reveal more than two tiers of equal protection analysis). 
41. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that due process and 
equal protection combine to prevent states from limiting appeals from custody-termination 
decisions to those parents who can afford record preparation fees); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing Douglas v. California and Griffin v. Illinois). 
42. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held 
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (rejecting strict scrutiny of Texas’s reliance 
on local property taxation in school system financing and stating that “where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages”). 
43. A situation like that in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in which we are at war 
with a particular nation, is one in which citizens of that nation who are soldiers (albeit not 
visibly) of its armed forces are distinguishable in principle from American citizens who join 
in their clandestine and hostile effort to injure Americans but are not members of any enemy 
nation or other organization with which we are at war. To be sure, the Quirin Court saw no 
justification for regarding such citizen turncoats as less eligible for trial by military tribunals 
than their noncitizen counterparts. But a distinction in that context between the two 
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considerable deference to the President in treating aliens less favorably than 
citizens in the distribution of social security or other similar benefits, or matters 
of employment, there is little room for such crudeness when doing so makes the 
difference between access to the fundamental protections of civilian justice—
from indictment to a jury trial presided over by a judge independent from the 
prosecutor, not to mention access to an appeal before a tribunal independent of 
the prosecuting authority—and relegation to a distinctly less protective, and 
blatantly inferior, brand of adjudication. 
The best defense of the government’s alienage policy must rest upon the 
similarity it bears to the 1798 Alien Enemy Act. That Act, passed alongside the 
constitutionally dubious Sedition Act, treated aliens differently than citizens in 
wartime: 
[W]henever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any 
foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion . . . by 
any foreign nation or government, and the President of the United States shall 
make public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or 
subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of 
fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not 
actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and 
removed, as alien enemies. And the President of the United States shall be, 
and he is hereby authorized . . . to direct . . . the manner and degree of the 
restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what 
security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of 
those not being permitted to reside within the United States . . . [p]rovided, 
that aliens resident within the United States, who shall become liable as 
enemies, in the manner aforesaid, and who shall not be chargeable with actual 
hostility, or other crime against the public safety, shall be allowed, for the 
recovery, disposal, and removal of their goods and effects, and for their 
departure, the full time which is, or shall be stipulated by any treaty, where 
any shall have been . . . and where no such treaty shall have existed, the 
President of the United States may ascertain and declare such reasonable time 
as may be consistent with the public safety, and according to the dictates of 
humanity and national hospitality. 
 
categories of unlawful belligerents would hardly have been irrational. In contrast, in a 
situation like the one we confront vis-à-vis al Qaeda, where we are at war with a 
supranational terrorist organization drawing support from many nations but being 
identifiable with none of them, it seems irrational to distinguish among unlawful 
belligerents—all of whom are members of the same terrorist group and with all of whom we 
are thus at war—on the basis of whether or not they happen also to be citizens of the United 
States as opposed to being citizens of, say, Saudi Arabia, France, or some other nation that 
may or may not be among the sponsors of terror but with which we are not, in any event, at 
war. In other words, it is one thing to give preferential treatment to U.S. citizens over their 
alien counterparts when that means giving less favorable treatment to citizens of a nation 
with which we are at war (and members of that enemy nation’s military), and quite another 
thing to give preferential treatment to U.S. citizens when noncitizenship, rather than being a 
proxy for membership in the armed forces of the enemy, simply means that one is merely an 
unlawful belligerent rather than being a traitor as well—hardly a reason to be treated more 
harshly. 
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 . . . [I]t shall be the duty of the several courts of the United States . . . to 
cause such alien or aliens to be duly apprehended and convened before such 
court, judge or justice; and after a full examination and hearing on such 
complaint, and sufficient cause therefor appearing, shall and may order such 
alien or aliens to be removed out of the territory of the United States, or to 
give sureties of their good behaviour, or to be otherwise restrained . . . .44 
Even assuming that the 1798 Act survived the incorporation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, note the several crucial limits built into it. Despite that 
historical moment—one marked by its insensitivity to constitutional rights, the 
Act only permitted banishment and detention, not criminal trial. The drafters 
took pains to make sure that it gave the government power to render individuals 
“apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies” and nothing 
more. There is at least some logic in saying that the privilege of residing on our 
territory shall not extend to citizens who have loyalty to a foreign government 
at war with our nation. (The Act might have even acted as an incentive program 
for individuals to renounce their citizenship to the enemy.) It is an entirely 
different ball of wax to say that the government is free to punish them—and 
perhaps even put them to death—under special rules only for aliens. This is 
particularly so when there is no citizenship in “al Qaeda” to renounce. 
The 1798 Act also built in procedural safeguards, insisting that those not 
“chargeable with actual hostility”45 be treated with particular rights. Indeed, the 
Act went so far as to require “a full examination and hearing on such 
complaint” for all aliens before the Act’s detention and removal could be 
triggered. These procedural and jurisdictional limits were accompanied by 
other well-known restrictions. The Act only applied—explicitly by its terms—
to declared wars.46 And it was further circumscribed by applying only to 
nations at war with the United States. Each of these restrictions exists in the 
modern day version of the Act—an Act that has not been a candidate for 
legislative revision in the modern era (and the political powerlessness of those 
affected by the Act offers a good explanation why). 
In the “global war on terror,” the government has sought to convert the 
principles behind the Act into a license to go after nationals of friendly 
 
44. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 577, 577-78. 
45. Id. § 1.  
46. The current version of the Act is found at 50 U.S.C. § 21, and in both the original 
form and the present version it is also triggered by a threatened or actual “invasion or 
predatory incursion . . . by any foreign nation or government.” See also United States ex rel. 
Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 (1952) (“The statutory power of the Attorney General 
to remove petitioner as an enemy alien ended when Congress terminated the war with 
Germany. Thus petitioner is no longer removable under the Alien Enemy Act.” (footnote 
omitted)); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166 n.11 (1948) (rejecting the view that the 
legislative history of the Alien Enemy Act shows that “declared war” meant “state of actual 
hostilities”); J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 
1402 (1992) (describing the Alien Enemy Act and stating that “a formal declaration of war” 
is “valuable” because it “forces Congress to acknowledge publicly, and to accept, that one 
cost of waging war is that individual liberty in the United States might have to suffer”). 
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countries, such as Australia, Britain, and Saudi Arabia. It has sought to do so 
when war has not been declared, and to do so under a theory with a perpetual 
basis. The government has further sought to use these powers to put people to 
death and impose the stigma of a criminal conviction upon them, instead of 
simply making them subject to mere banishment. And it has even said that it 
can divest accused detainees of the writ of habeas corpus, so that, unlike those 
subject to the 1798 Act, they may receive no prompt federal court hearing on 
their status. Whatever the status of the alien-enemy doctrine may be today, it 
has historically been circumscribed by time (declared war) and manner (nations 
with whom the United States is at war). Eliminating those constraints gives the 
President a much larger set of powers. 
It is no small matter for a U.S. citizen to take up with the enemy and 
proceed by stealth to slaughter his fellow citizens.47 Given the absence of any 
apparent reason to suppose that whatever considerations make military 
commissions better suited to the national interest in the case of foreign 
belligerents than in the case of American citizens who turn on their nation, the 
line drawn by the MCA would appear to be wholly irrational, or at least not 
justified as clearly as a line bearing on access to such fundamental rights must 
be. 
When defenders of the line being drawn can, in truth, invoke little beyond 
the obvious political convenience of stilling the voices that might otherwise rise 
up in protest were American citizens included in the MCA, due process of law 
demands more evenhanded treatment by the government. As the Court 
established in Wong Wing v. United States, “even aliens shall not be held to 
answer for a capital or other infamous crime” without the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment.48 In Wong Wing, the government intended to deport four 
noncitizens for illegal presence, but first sentenced them to sixty days in jail. 
The Court upheld the deportation order, but invalidated the sixty-day sentence 
because it had been issued without the constitutional safeguards that would 
have protected a similarly situated citizen. Wong Wing continues to be invoked 
for the proposition that aliens are entitled to the same constitutional protections 
as are citizens in criminal proceedings. The war on terror demands nothing less. 
If that war requires military commissions, then they should be imposed on 
citizen and enemy alike. And, if citizen detainees require full habeas corpus 
rights, alien detainees require them, too. 
 
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist 
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort.”). 
48. 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
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2. The habeas corpus stripping provisions 
The MCA does not use alienage only as a basis to decide who is subject to 
commission trial. Crucially, it purports to deny the writ of habeas corpus to any 
alien detained by the United States.49 As the text of the MCA makes clear, its 
habeas stripping provisions are not limited to those detained at Guantanamo. 
Rather, it deprives those rights from all aliens, even lawful resident aliens 
living within the United States. Once again, citizens remain free to challenge 
their detention in civilian courts, while aliens remain subject to executive 
determination of their combatant status. Timothy McVeigh would be permitted 
to file a habeas claim, but an alien alleged to be McVeigh’s low-level 
sympathizer would be barred from filing a petition, even if the alien never 
killed anyone or harbored any intention of doing so. 
Shutting our courthouse doors to alien detainees, both green card holders 
and foreigners, sends the message that their rights are less worthy of protection 
than those of U.S. citizens. Yet everything about the Equal Protection Clause—
from its plain text to its original intent—shudders at the notion that access to 
justice could be conditioned on citizenship. 
The MCA obstructs access to what is arguably the Constitution’s most 
fundamental right—the right to seek relief under habeas corpus. As the Court 
declared in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, habeas is among the rights “to be 
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty.”50 The right of access 
to habeas is indeed so important to our constitutional tradition that it is singled 
out for constitutional protection.51 
The MCA’s attempt to blockade alien detainees from access to habeas 
cannot survive the exacting scrutiny triggered by the infringement of such a 
fundamental right. Far less intrusive barriers to court access have been subject 
to strict scrutiny under equal protection, and have failed to survive. For 
example, in Douglas v. California,52 the Court struck down on equal protection 
grounds a California law that allowed the appellate court to pick and choose 
whether indigent defendants would be entitled to appellate counsel. And in 
Griffin v. Illinois,53 the Court invalidated a regulation that denied defendants 
access to the trial court transcript necessary for appellate review. As the Court 
noted, “our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection 
both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious 
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.”54 The right 
 
49. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2635-36 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2241 (2007)). 
50. 403 U.S. 443, 454 n.4 (1971); see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 
(1968) (noting that habeas is “shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights”). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
52. 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963). 
53. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
54. Id. at 17. 
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of habeas is antecedent to any other right to court access. The MCA barricades 
courthouse doors against alien detainees, silencing their ability to challenge 
their detentions and nullifying their exercise of any due process rights. 
Nor can the MCA’s distinction be justified as a codification of Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,55 the 1950 Supreme Court decision that said that enemy aliens 
outside the United States lacked access to the writ. That decision relied in part 
on the 1798 Act—an Act that bears little resemblance to the MCA, as explained 
above, for reasons of scope, duration, and impact.56 In addition, the text of the 
MCA permits suspension of habeas corpus in the continental United States, and 
the government has recently invoked that very provision in court to bar an 
immigrant in the continental United States from access to the writ.57 
Moreover, the MCA attempts to strip access to the writ from the detainees 
at Guantanamo, despite the fact that the Court has suggested that Guantanamo 
is quite different than the prison at issue in Eisentrager. Eisentrager suggests, 
after all, that equal protection guarantees cannot apply with full force 
throughout the globe. The text of the 1870 Enforcement Act itself reflects its 
geographic limitations, referring to those “under the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”58 Whatever the outer bounds of such limitations may be (e.g., does 
“jurisdiction” extend to all enemy combatant trials, whether in Africa or 
Manhattan?), Rasul v. Bush,59 read carefully, shows that Guantanamo falls 
within its scope.  
In Rasul, the Court appears to have rejected the government’s assertion that 
Guantanamo is a land outside U.S. jurisdiction.60 Indeed, as “[t]he United 
States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base,”61 the Court observed that alien detainees held at Guantanamo are 
not categorically barred from raising constitutional claims. The majority 
dropped a pointed footnote, strongly suggesting that the detainees were 
protected by the Constitution.62 Indeed, Justice Kennedy separately concluded 
 
55. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775 
(describing how the Alien Enemy Act is triggered only by a declaration of war and opining 
that when such a state of war exists, “courts will not inquire into any other issue as to [an 
alien enemy’s] internment”). 
57. See Respondent-Appellee’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction at 3, Al-Marri v. Wright, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_47350.pdf. 
58. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2007)). 
59. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 467. 
62. The footnote states: 
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of 
terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for more than 
two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—
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that Guantanamo detainees had a constitutional right, unlike the petitioners in 
Eisentrager, to bring habeas petitions.63 It makes sense not to constitutionalize 
the battlefield; but a long-term, concerted punishment system in an area far 
from active hostilities, like the one in operation at Guantanamo Bay, looks 
nothing like a battlefield. 
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE AND LEGAL PROCESS 
Strong reasons undergird America’s traditional insistence on basic equality 
when the most awesome, punitive powers of government are at stake. As we 
saw in the Introduction, Justice Scalia, among others, has strongly argued that 
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection stands as a way to ensure that 
the most weak and vulnerable are represented by the powerful. If Congress 
deems terror suspects too great a threat to warrant access to federal courts, at a 
minimum they must deny such access for all persons, and not selectively target 
only those without a political voice. This Part considers three advantages of 
such an approach: sidestepping the substantive constitutionalization of the war 
on terror; enabling deference to government decisionmaking; and bolstering 
national security. 
A. Substantive Constitutionalization in the War on Terror 
It is a truism in war powers analysis that the courts fear rigid rules that 
might deprive the President of tools he needs to wage war effectively. For that 
reason, a tremendous amount of substantive litigation—on war powers, covert 
operations, intelligence-gathering techniques, and the like is often never 
adjudicated on the merits.64 The Court adopts a Bickelian passive-virtues 
approach65 to defer such inquiries, sometimes going even beyond Bickel to the 
point of not reaching them at all.66 Substantive challenges rarely succeed for 
these reasons. 
Procedural challenges, however, are more plausible candidates for success. 
Two of the Supreme Court’s strongest rebukes to the President during armed 
 
unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and cases cited therein. 
Id. at 484 n.15. This passage obviously concerns constitutional violations, otherwise the 
Court’s citation to pages in Justice Kennedy’s Verdugo concurrence would make no sense, 
as those pages deal exclusively with the Constitution’s applicability. 
63. Id. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
64. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 56 (1993).  
65. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
66. See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Comment: Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 84-86 (2006). 
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conflict, Youngstown and Hamdan, both placed the Court in the position of not 
having to freeze a substantive view of the law into place. Instead, the Court 
held that the relevant action had to be authorized by Congress, not the 
President. Justice Black said in Youngstown that seizing the mills was “a job for 
the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.”67 In Hamdan, Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence said “[n]othing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”68 To be sure, there were 
Justices who went further: Justice Douglas said the seizure of the steel mills 
could not be done without paying just compensation for example.69 And Justice 
Kennedy in Hamdan stated that “[i]f Congress, after due consideration, deems 
it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, in conformance with the 
Constitution and other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do so.”70 But 
much of the action in these cases is at the level of process. 
Equal protection offers another vehicle to achieve a focus on process 
instead of substance. The Court, when it confronts an equal protection 
challenge, is not being asked to codify a particular substantive standard into 
law. Equal protection challenges to the MCA, for example, do not ask whether 
Congress can authorize military commissions or strip habeas rights; they 
simply say that whatever substantive rules Congress settles upon, it must apply 
them symmetrically to all persons. 
In this way, equal protection challenges can become the enemy of 
individual liberty ones. The legislative response to a Court decision striking 
down the MCA on equal protection grounds might be to make everyone eligible 
for military commissions—citizens and aliens alike. For that reason, it misses 
the mark for the government to assert “national security” in response to equal 
protection challenges, for it very well may be that the nation’s security is 
increased, not diminished, by a successful equal protection challenge. The 
upshot may be to have more, not fewer, commission trials. 
The structural logic of insisting on equality in this area has, as its starting 
point, a deep unease about the proper substantive standard. Instead, the focus 
rests upon the decisionmaking process and ensuring that the interests of those 
that do not have a voice in the legislature are effectively represented by those 
that do. Under those conditions, the legislature will be less likely to externalize 
their problems onto the powerless, and more likely to reach a better decision. 
The powerless, in effect, give their proxy vote to the powerful, knowing that 
when the powerful are brought within the ambit of the laws, lawmaking is 
likely to become fairer. The process of virtual representation, with a pedigree 
going back even further than McCulloch, also has the benefit of forcing 
legislative reconsideration of questionable choices. 
 
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
68. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
69. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
70. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added). 
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This type of move might be understood as a species of constitutional 
avoidance doctrine. Obviously, it does not sidestep all of the constitutional 
questions. Rather, the equality move posits a constitutional baseline, similar to 
separation of powers, that the Court is to enforce, but it then permits the 
legislature room for rethinking and recognizes its primacy. One lens through 
which to view such moves is Sager’s underenforcement paradigm.71 Sager 
pointed out that, due to institutional competence and other limitations, courts 
are unable to define constitutional protections with completeness and that 
sometimes Congress will be better poised to define these “underenforced” 
rights. The paradigm, applied to the modern day, would suggest that for 
understandable institutional competence limitations, the judiciary cannot 
adequately police the boundaries of individual liberty in the war on terror. The 
most courts can effectively do when so many variables are in flux is to create 
deliberation-forcing mechanisms, as Hamdan did. 
This is not to say that deliberation forcing will itself be successful. Sager’s 
theory works best when Congress is poised to respect constitutional rights that 
the courts are structurally incapable of vindicating. But sometimes legislative 
underenforcement of constitutional protections is just as serious a problem as 
judicial underenforcement. This scenario is most likely to unfold when the 
legislature is passing laws that carve out the powerless for special disfavor. 
Accordingly, for deliberation-forcing doctrines to work correctly, courts cannot 
simply resuscitate the role of Congress via separation of powers (such as 
Hamdan), they must also enforce equality guarantees as well. This is a 
corollary to judicial underenforcement: that “second look” or “legislative 
remand” doctrines might need to remedy political process failures in order for 
the doctrines to be effective. 
B. Deference 
When legislation is of general applicability, it is not only likely to be fairer, 
it is also likely to be brought within traditional canons that permit it to receive 
deference from the courts. Political accountability is a crucial component for 
deference, and when legislation only impacts people without a vote, it cannot 
be easily justified under that matrix. Indeed, there are good reasons for taking 
legislative activity out of the realm of deference altogether when the action 
directly affects only the powerless.72 Executives that seek to harness the 
 
71. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
72. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 92-93 (“The ultimate question must be: in practice 
do [the laws] burden all of us, or only those who do not carry weight in the legislature? If the 
latter is the case, legislatures cannot be relied upon.”). Calabresi focused on a somewhat 
different claim here—that it would be up to courts to assess whether the law would have 
passed had it been more broadly applicable: “Courts must . . . determine for themselves 
whether the legislature would have passed such a law if the burden rested on those to whom 
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benefits of deference in court would therefore be well advised to avoid blatant 
discrimination on the basis of alienage. 
The tradition of deference is built on, inter alia, the rock of political 
accountability—that Congress is accountable in ways that the federal courts are 
not. That is why, in cases such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
the Court has held that certain classifications, including those based on 
alienage, are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy” and has imposed strict scrutiny “because such 
discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means.”73 One can 
see the emphasis on accountability explicitly in the caselaw,74 and in the fact 
that federal agencies (who possess some accountability and much expertise) 
will lose when they conflict with the far more directly accountable Congress.75 
And when accountability is lacking, the case for deference is much weaker. As 
Justice Powell put it in Chadha: “Congress is most accountable politically 
when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of 
specific persons, those rights are subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting 
majority.’”76 A similar point has been made in widely different areas of 
constitutional law.77 
 
the legislators had to answer at the polls and not just on ‘outcasts.’” Id. at 94. The approach 
in this Article differs, for it gives primacy to institutional competence limitations, one of 
which is that courts lack the ability to determine whether a law might have passed were it 
worded differently. Instead, when a court is faced with a discriminatory law such as the 
MCA, the proper course is to strike it down and wait for the legislature to pass a more 
generally applicable one if the votes can be mustered. 
73. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
74. In the recent compelled funding case Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 
U.S. 550 (2005), the Court upheld a beef advertisement program over a First Amendment 
challenge. The Court observed that some of its decisions “have justified compelled funding 
of government speech by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic 
accountability.” Id. at 563. It stressed the oversight roles played by the Secretary of 
Agriculture and, more abstractly, Congress, in the beef program. Id. at 563-64. 
75. For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), 
the Court held that the FDA did not have the authority to regulate tobacco because Congress 
had reserved that authority for itself. In a note at the end of the majority opinion, the Court 
stated that “regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically 
accountable . . . an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must 
always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.” Id. at 161. This sentence 
directly confronts the dissent (penned by Justice Breyer, with three justices concurring) that 
suggested that agencies and Congress stood on equal footing with respect to democratic 
accountability. See id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
76. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).  
77. For example, the Free Exercise Clause proscribes “prohibition[s] that society is 
prepared to impose upon [religious minorities] but not upon itself,” Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545 (1993) (quotation omitted), but does 
not restrict “neutral law[s] of general applicability” resulting from the normal “political 
process” in our “democratic government,” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 
890 (1990). Similarly, when tax laws “single[] out the press,” the Court has struck them 
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With respect to certain constitutional clauses, the Court has been 
particularly deferential to the accountable legislature. For example, in the 
seminal eminent domain decision Berman v. Parker,78 the Court observed that 
“when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive.”79 Therefore, “[t]he role of the judiciary . . . is an 
extremely narrow one.”80 And in a decision equally important to the Eighth 
Amendment, Gregg v. Georgia, the decision reinstating the death penalty, the 
Court noted that “the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of 
contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in 
ascertaining such standards.”81 
Nevertheless, the Court does not appear to have grappled recently with a 
circumstance where the lack of accountability has led to more rigorous judicial 
scrutiny. For example, the Court has acknowledged, but has not fully 
recognized, how the threat of a veto affects legislative decisionmaking.82 The 
wheel need not be reinvented, however, as it happens to be supported by the 
most important footnote in all of constitutional law. The basic contours of the 
point—that the lack of accountability removes a key basis for judicial 
deference—are evident in Carolene Products. With our modern blinkered tiers 
of scrutiny and jargon, we forget that Carolene Products was not even an equal 
protection case.83 But the Court went out of its way to explain why the case for 
 
down because “the political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling 
taxes of general applicability are weakened,” whereas general taxation laws are upheld 
because there is little cause to “fear that a government will destroy a selected group of 
taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its 
constituency.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
585 (1983). A similar point can be made about the Commerce Clause. See S.C. State 
Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (requiring heightened 
scrutiny of laws whose “burden falls principally upon those without the state” because such 
laws are “not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted 
on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state”). 
78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
79. Id. at 32. Its broad reading of public purpose was recently endorsed in Kelo v. City 
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-81 (2005). 
80. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
81. 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). 
82. When the Court evaluated an airport commission overseen by the House of 
Representatives, it found impermissible encroachment by the legislature that would interfere 
with accountability. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13 (1991) (“The threat of the veto hangs . . . like the sword 
over Damocles, creating a ‘here-and-now subservience’ to the [House] Board of Review 
sufficient to raise constitutional questions.”). 
83. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (“Appellee 
raises no valid objection to the present statute by arguing that its prohibition has not been 
extended to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegetable fats or oils are 
substituted for butter fat. The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that 
of the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their Legislatures to prohibit 
all like evils, or none.”). Only with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), was the equality 
guarantee extended to the federal government. 
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deference was weaker when legislation was aimed at a discrete and insular 
minority: 
 It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most 
other types of legislation. . . . 
 Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; 
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.84 
In short, footnote four suggests that the political powerlessness of a group 
affected by a law is a reason against evaluating that law under deferential 
rational basis review. And just in case there was any doubt, Justice Stone added 
a pointed citation at the end of the footnote to justify “more searching judicial 
inquiry,” citing the precise page of McCulloch where Chief Justice Marshall 
had made his point about virtual representation.  
In a 1971 alienage case, the Court revitalized the footnote and placed it 
centrally within equal protection jurisprudence.85 Modern cases have suggested 
that legislation aimed at the powerless is less likely to be the result of good- 
faith efforts in Congress. For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court suggested 
that the label “suspect class” represents a probability that legislation singling 
out that group lacks a “legitimate objective” and is the result of prejudice, not 
good faith policymaking.86 In settings such as Plyler and Cleburne,87 the Court 
is vindicating a view of human nature that goes back to Madison in Federalist 
51, that government is necessary because men are not angels and therefore need 
some apparatus of restraint—including the “external” restraint of popular 
accountability.88 
There are, of course, other reasons for deference apart from political 
accountability. Justice Frankfurter’s classic treatment rooted the doctrine in 
notions of accountability alongside institutional competence and the fact that 
members of Congress take an oath to uphold the Constitution: “Courts are not 
representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a 
 
84. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
85. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (stating that aliens are “a 
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority”). 
86. 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
87. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
88. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.”). 
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democratic society.”89 But some of these claims, such as 
“representative[ness],” will naturally depend on whether the specific population 
affected by a proposed law is being represented in the legislative process. That 
is not to say that other rationales for judicial restraint are irrelevant,90 but 
simply to note that the case for restraint is more muted in such a setting. 
Concerns about institutional competence are also less relevant when the 
courts are examining issues of fundamental justice, as they sometimes are in 
the war on terror cases. In such settings, the courts tread on familiar ground, 
and there often is a self-dealing aspect to some of the legislation, such as when 
a law blocks the ability of federal courts to even hear challenges to legislation 
(for example, the MCA’s prohibition on aliens seeking writs of habeas 
corpus).91 The Court, for example, does not extend deference when Congress 
legislates a standard of review under the aegis of its Fourteenth Amendment 
remedial and prophylactic powers.92 
To be sure, there is always some political accountability when the 
legislature absolutely deprives aliens of their rights. For example, American 
citizens could be aghast at the MCA and vote out those who voted for it in 
Congress. But that form of accountability is too weak, as it posits an uber-
empathetic voting population so concerned for the rights of others that they will 
vote on the basis of policies that do not impact their own lives. This is just too 
fanciful. Virtual representation cannot be effective if it depends on heroic 
assumptions of empathy, just as our early countrymen recognized by placing 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV and writing McCulloch with 
virtual representation in mind. 
One final point follows from this lack of representation: its impact on the 
statutory precedent doctrine. Typically, courts award strong stare decisis effect 
to previous interpretations of a statute.93 The idea is that Congress can override 
any judicial mistake about a statute; when they choose not to and instead leave 
a statutory interpretation undisturbed, then that precedent attains special force. 
But if the legislation is one that singles out only the powerless, or if its vague 
language is read by a court to do so, there is no reason to award that level of 
 
89. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951); see also Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
90. Institutional competence concerns may explain why Hampton permitted a looser 
standard of scrutiny for a federal alienage classification, despite having recognized the 
political powerlessness of aliens. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976). 
91. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Where a private citizen challenges action of the Government on grounds unrelated to 
separation of powers, harmonious functioning of the system demands that we ordinarily give 
some deference, or a presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in what 
is agreed, between themselves at least, to be within their respective spheres. But where the 
issue pertains to separation of powers, and the political branches are (as here) in 
disagreement, neither can be presumed correct.”). 
92. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
93. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
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respect to a previous judicial interpretation. For all of the process failure 
reasons discussed above, it is very unlikely for that statute to be a viable 
candidate for legislative revision, even when the courts made a mistake and 
improperly interpreted the statute. Accordingly, precedents that single out 
aliens for special disfavor do not have all the characteristics of stability that 
evenhanded laws possess, and do not deserve the same level of deference as an 
ordinary statutory precedent. 
C. The Undermining of National Security Policy and U.S. Reputation Abroad 
The disparity between the rights of alien and citizen detainees presumes the 
former are more dangerous, so much so that the confines of our constitutional 
protections cannot contain them. But our country knows all too well that the 
kind of hatred and evil that has led to the massacre of innocent civilians is born 
both at home and abroad. The threat of terrorism knows no nationality; rather, 
it is a global plague, and its perpetrators must be brought to justice no matter 
what their country of origin. Terrorism does not discriminate in choosing its 
disciples. If anything, we can expect organizations such as al Qaeda to select, 
wherever possible, American citizens to carry out its despicable bidding. The 
Attorney General himself has recently reminded us that “[t]he threat of 
homegrown terrorist cells . . . may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if 
not more so.”94 
Nothing in the MCA, nor the Detainee Treatment Act95 or the Military 
Order that preceded it, suggests that military commissions are more necessary 
for aliens than for citizens suspected of terrorist activities. Indeed, both the 
Executive and Congress appear to believe that citizens and noncitizens pose an 
equal threat in the war on terror. Since the attacks of September 11th, the 
Executive has argued for presidential authority to detain and prosecute U.S. 
citizens as terrorists in cases such as Padilla and Hamdi. And in the latter, the 
Supreme Court agreed that “[a] citizen, no less than an alien, can be part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners and engaged 
in an armed conflict against the United States, such a citizen, if released, would 
 
94. Alberto Gonzalez, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the World Affairs Council of 
Pittsburgh on Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of 
Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ 
ag_speech_060816.html); see also Foiled Dirty-Bomb Plot Reveals Chilling New Threats, 
USA TODAY, June 11, 2002, at 10A (reporting that when announcing Jose Padilla’s arrest in 
2002 for suspicion of planning a dirty bomb attack on U.S. soil, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft described Padilla’s American citizenship as attractive to al Qaeda because Padilla 
could move freely and easily within the United States); Jessica Stern, Op-Ed., Al Qaeda, 
American Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A15 (fearing that al Qaeda is aiming to recruit 
American citizens for domestic terror attacks). 
95. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§1001-1006, 119 Stat. 
2739 (codified in different sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  
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pose the same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.”96 
Likewise, Congress did not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens in the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which provided the President with 
the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”97 
There is simply no reason why the government must subject aliens who are 
alleged to have participated in acts of terrorism to military commissions, but 
need not do so for citizens suspected of the same crimes. If it is truly necessary 
to treat aliens this way to combat terrorism effectively, then the very same need 
would exist for citizens as well. A citizen who commits a terrorist act is just as 
culpable as the alien who commits that act. Indeed, there is an argument that 
the citizen’s actions are worse—since he is guilty of treason in addition to 
whatever else he has perpetrated. 
The breakdown in parity between citizen and alien post-9/11 is a new, and 
disturbing, trend. Even the horrendous internment of Japanese Americans in 
World War II applied symmetrically to citizens and aliens.98 The policy was 
memorably defended by Lieutenant General John DeWit before Congress: “A 
Jap’s a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not.”99 
Some, such as former Chief Justice Rehnquist, have disagreed, arguing that the 
problem in World War II was applying these exclusion orders to citizens. His 
argument was grounded entirely upon the Alien Enemy Act, which he 
recognized permitted only the “‘summary arrest, internment and deportation 
wherever a declared war exists.’”100 Entirely missing from this account was 
any discussion of whether a disparity between alien and citizen might have 
made matters worse, instead of better. After all, the one positive thing that can 
be said in the policy’s favor was that at least it affected a few people who could 
vote.101 
 
96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (internal quotation omitted). 
97. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (emphasis added). 
98. For example, the Los Angeles evacuation order evidently provided that “[a]ll 
persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated.” Civilian 
Exclusion Order No. 34, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 28, 1942). 
99. Constitutional Rights Found., America Responds to Terrorism: Wartime and the 
Bill of Rights: The Korematsu Case, http://www.crf-usa.org/terror/korematsu.htm (quoting 
DeWitt).  
100. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
210 (1998) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950)).  
101. Carving out particular races for special disfavor can pose some of the same 
process concerns as carving out noncitizens. In both, empathy failure can be an important 
variable: government officials behind the detention faced no risk whatsoever that they would 
be interned—they could never be accused of being Japanese. It is notable that, despite the 
massive threat posed by Germany, German-Americans were not subject to a similar mass 
detention order. There can be no doubt that equality grounds would have condemned the 
World War II internment of Japanese-Americans. 
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To say this is not to argue that liberty concerns are always inappropriate 
and that the government has carte blanche when it acts evenhandedly. There are 
some substantive constitutional principles—such as prohibiting the mass 
detention of an entire race of people without any individualized basis—that 
properly should be frozen into constitutional law. But when the boundaries of 
liberty are uncertain, as they tend to be today, equality arguments offer a 
mechanism to prompt legislative reconsideration and democratic 
accountability. 
Laws of general applicability are not only preferable, they also keep us 
safer. In affording the same process to alien and citizen detainees, we maintain 
the superiority of our judicial system. The federal courts have a tried and true 
record of discerning the guilty from the innocent without turning to arbitrary 
distinctions such as alienage. Our civilian courts have handled a variety of 
challenges and complicated cases—from the trial of the Oklahoma City 
bombers to the awful spying of Aldrich Ames and others. They have tried the 
1993 World Trade Center bombers, Manuel Noriega, and dozens of other cases. 
They have prosecuted cases where the crimes were committed abroad. Indeed, 
the Justice Department has recently extolled its resounding success in terrorism 
cases in federal civilian court—where it has proceeded to charge nearly 500 
individuals with crimes of terrorism.102 Our national security policy requires 
adherence to a judicial process that works for all terrorist suspects. A two-
tiered justice system jeopardizes not only the rights of alien suspects, but also 
the safety of American citizens. 
As the world becomes even smaller, and the movement of people across 
borders becomes even more fluid, we need a unitary legal system that is 
capable of embracing all those in our jurisdiction: one that does not pick and 
choose who gets fundamental protections. Only then can we be assured that the 
real terrorists are brought to justice. 
Moreover, legislation should not play on post-9/11 xenophobia. In the 
wake of terrorism, fears are heightened, rationality is muted, and it is the 
government’s responsibility to be the source of reason amidst the chaos, not to 
fan fears and stimulate even greater hatred. In pointing toward alien detainees 
as the sole source of danger, however, legislation such as the MCA fails to 
provide actual solutions to the threat of terrorism. Our policy cannot afford to 
dally under any delusions that foreigners are the sole source of terrorist 
impulses. The threat of terrorism permeates all borders, and only fair and 
evenhanded laws can effectively ferret out that threat. Allowing rank 
discrimination to drive policy takes attention away from national security and 
focuses on meaningless distinctions of “us” versus “them.”103 
 
102. Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American 
Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
speech/2006/dag_speech_060524.html). 
103. Computer security expert Bruce Schneier has put the point well: 
Profiling can also blind you to threats outside the profile. If U.S. border guards stop and 
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Finally, in the wake of international disdain for the military tribunals 
authorized by President Bush, our country is already under global scrutiny for 
its disparate treatment of non-U.S. citizens. We must be careful not to further 
the perception that, in matters of justice, the U.S. government adopts special 
rules that single out foreigners for disfavor. Otherwise, the result will be more 
international condemnation and increased enmity about Americans worldwide. 
The predictable result will be less cooperation and intelligence sharing, and 
fewer extraditions to boot. 
In this respect, the laws of war have changed markedly in recent years, and 
now reflect the basic equality principle. The Geneva Conventions, for example, 
require a signatory to treat enemy prisoners of war the same way as it treats its 
own soldiers.104 Even for non-prisoners of war, the minimum requirements of 
Common Article 3 require trials to take place in a “regularly constituted 
court.”105 As the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary puts 
it: 
[C]ourt proceedings should be carried out in a uniform manner, whatever the 
nationality of the accused. Nationals, friends, enemies, all should be subject to 
the same rules of procedure and judged by the same courts. There is therefore 
no question of setting up special tribunals to try war criminals of enemy 
nationality.106  
Again, the logic of such provisions is best understood as creating virtual 
representation—ensuring that the interests of accused enemies will be 
vindicated by the application of longstanding procedural rules for the trial of 
the signatory power’s own troops. 
Fidelity to these precepts, far from undermining the war on terror, is the 
best way to win it. By demonstrating that America is not being unfair—and by 
subjecting those from other lands to the same justice Americans face for the 
same crimes—America projects not only benevolence, but strength. America’s 
soft power depends, in no small part, on being able to rise above pettiness and 
to highlight the vitality of our system. Carving out special rules for “them” and 
reserving different rules for “us” is no way to win respect internationally. 
 
search everyone who’s young, Arab, and male, they’re not going to have the time to stop and 
search all sorts of other people, no matter how hinky they might be acting. . . . [I]t actually 
can reduce security by blinding people to the real threats. Institutionalized profiling can 
ossify a mind, and a person’s mind is the most important security countermeasure we have. 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 136-37 (2003). 
104. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 102, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
105. See id. art. 3(1)(d). 
106. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 623 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney 
trans., 1960). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the 
U.S. government has ratified, sets out in article 14(1) that all persons “shall be equal before 
the courts and tribunals.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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The British experience provides a useful contrast. The House of Lords in A 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,107 struck down the terrorist 
detention policy on equality grounds. They found that there was no reasonable 
or objective justification why a non-U.K. national suspected of being a terrorist 
could be detained while a U.K. national would be allowed to go free. The Lords 
rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that immigration law and 
international law justified differential treatment, including detention, of aliens 
in times of war or public emergency.108 As Lord Nicholls put it, “The principal 
weakness in the Government’s case lies in the different treatment accorded to 
nationals and non-nationals. . . . The Government has vouchsafed no persuasive 
explanation of why national security calls for a power of indefinite detention in 
one case but not the other.”109 The upshot was that it was “difficult to see how 
the extreme circumstances, which alone would justify such detention, can exist 
when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British citizens 
suspected of being international terrorists.”110  
Sadly, the experience of Britain under the European Convention on Human 
Rights is far truer to our backbone of equality than that of our own politicians 
under our own Constitution, who conveniently forget about equality even on 
fundamental decisions such as who would face a military trial with the death 
penalty at stake. Indeed, the United Kingdom reacted to the decision by 
adopting laws that treated citizens and foreigners alike.111 Although our 
Founders broke away from Britain in part because of the King’s refusal to 
adhere to the basic proposition that “all men are created equal,” it is now 
Britain that is teaching us about the meaning of those words. 
In sum, by splitting our legal standards on the basis of alienage, we are in 
effect jeopardizing our own safety and national interest. When terror policy is 
driven by anti-alien sentiment, the result is only our own isolation. It will not 
only chill relations with key allies abroad and disrupt extraditions, it will also 
alienate many of our own citizens who have relied on our country’s 
longstanding commitment to equal justice for all. 
 
107. [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68.  
108. “The Secretary of State was, of course, entitled to discriminate between British 
nationals on the one hand and foreign nationals on the other for all the purposes of 
immigration control . . . . What he was not entitled to do was to treat the right to liberty . . . 
of foreign nationals who happen to be in this country for whatever reason as different in any 
respect from that enjoyed by British nationals.” Id. at 134. 
109. Id. at 127-28. 
110. Id. at 127. 
111. Compare Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 21 (applying 
only to “international terrorist[s]”), with Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(9)(d) 
(applying to all “individuals who are known or believe to be involved in terrorism-related 
activity”). As the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Charles Clarke, put it in 
supporting the new Act: “I accept, too, the Lords’ judgment that new legislative measures 
must apply equally to nationals as well as to non-nationals.” 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) 
(Jan. 26, 2005) 306 (statement of Charles Clarke). 
  
March 2007] EQUALITY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 1393 
CONCLUSION 
The who question tends to be submerged for many academics and 
litigators. These individuals would prefer instead to think about big 
philosophical questions about the balance between liberty and security. In this 
symposium piece, I’ve tried to be analytic, rather than personal. But for me, at 
least, the son of immigrants who were green card holders and thus subject to 
the President’s order as noncitizens, the equality arguments are at least as 
important. 
I remember the first time I traveled down to Guantanamo Bay. It was 
November 6, 2004. I had been trying to go to Guantanamo for many months to 
see Mr. Hamdan, as I had already filed the habeas petition in his case and 
argued it in the district court. But the government for many months said I had 
no “need to know”—no reason to be there to meet him. I ultimately received 
permission, and embarked on the over twenty-four-hour trip to Cuba. When I 
finally got to the camp where they were detaining him, Mr. Hamdan kicked 
everyone out of the room except for me. I thought he was going to yell at me—
as by that point he had been detained for nearly three years, with ten of those 
months in solitary confinement. Instead, he looked at me, and said “I have just 
one question for you: Why are you doing this? Wasn’t your last client Al Gore? 
Why go from him to me?” 
The question took me by surprise. I was so immersed in the details of the 
legal battle I had forgotten to think about the meta-reason why I was in it at all. 
There were a million smaller reasons, to be sure, but I paused for about a half 
minute while I weighed some of them in my mind. One stood out then, and still 
does today. I told him that my parents came here from India, with eight dollars 
in their pockets, and chose this land because of its central commitment to 
equality. They knew they could arrive on our shores and be treated fairly, and 
that their children would be treated fairly. There is no nation on earth, I told 
Mr. Hamdan, that would have given me—the son of immigrants—the 
opportunities I had. The education, the chance to work in the Supreme Court, to 
handle some of the most sensitive national security matters for the Clinton 
Administration. I told him that I was deeply patriotic for these reasons, and that 
when President Bush issued his order, it was the first time in my life that I felt 
that this vision of America—my parents’ vision—was being violated. I told 
him that was why I had to do something. 
Discrimination against aliens is particularly pernicious given our nation’s 
history. We are a land of immigrants. The Declaration of Independence lists as 
first among its “self-evident truths” the idea that “all men are created equal.” So 
important was the concept that it appears before the commonly quoted 
protection of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” To be sure, it took 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Representative Bingham to make the equality 
promise of the Declaration real. But real they have been. While being afraid is 
not easy, neither is abandoning our most fundamental precepts. A two-track 
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system of justice is so deeply in tension with the American ideal of equality—
an ideal that stretches from the Declaration to the Fourteenth Amendment, from 
McCulloch to the Enforcement Act, from Justice Jackson to Justice Scalia—as 
to caution the greatest of prudence in departing from it. 
Once again, I conclude with a reminder of the powerful words of an 
American patriot, Thomas Paine, who encapsulated our American promise in a 
single sentence: “He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even 
his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a 
precedent that will reach to himself.”112 
 
 
 
112. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 83, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 
(2006) (No. 05-184), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/05-184.pdf (quoting Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of 
Government (July 1795), in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 570, 588 (Philip 
S. Foner ed., 1945)); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1310 (2002) (quoting In re Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1, 81 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Paine)). 
